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WHAT'S SO SPECIAL ABOUT JUDGES?
FRANK

H.

EASTERBROOK*

Article III of the Constitution says that the "judicial Power of the
United States" belongs to the Supreme Court and such "inferior"
courts as Congress chooses to establish. It tells us that judges may
resolve "Cases" and "Controversies" and that Congress may make
"Exceptions" to and "Regulations" of the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction. And it says that federal judges hold office during "good
Behavior." That is a spare mandate. The Constitution does not identify the scope of the "judicial Power" or spell out what "Behavior" is
"good."
Article III does not mention the power that has come to be synonymous with the judiciary in popular, political, and academic
minds: to set aside statutes and regulations that do not comport with
the Constitution and to direct other political actors to implement the
judges' constitutional vision. Such a power of review was not granted;
it was inferred.
It was not inferred because of any attribute unique to judges.
Under the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution binds the states; the
President takes a special oath to uphold the Constitution; every political actor owes an obligation to put the Constitution (the "supreme
Law of the Land") first, a statute'or regulation second, and his private
conception of The Good third., Nothing in the text of the Constitution marks a special role forjudges; each public official applies the
Constitution when it is time to act'
"Expertise," a leading contemporary justification for the judicial
role, did not support judicial review in 1803. By and large the drafters
of the Constitution sat in Congress, not on the Court. Not until after
the Civil War did the Court start undoing (on Constitutional grounds)
the work of Congress. Such experience as judges have acquired is a
consequence of their jobs, not a cause. Anyway, professors of law
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, The University
of Chicago School of Law. This essay is a comment on Frederick Schauer, Judicial Self-Understanding
and the Internalizationof ConstitutionalRules, presented at the Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Constitutional
Law Conference at the University of Colorado on April 13, 1990. It is © 1990 by Frank H. Easterbrook. I thank Alan J. Meese and Richard A. Posner for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See Alleghany Corp. v. Haase, 896 F.2d 1046, 1054-56 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); Cooper v. Eugene School Dist. No. 4J, 301 Or. 358, 362-365 & n.7, 723 P.2d 299, 302-03 &
n.7 (1986) (Linde, J.). See also Easterbrook, PresidentialReview, in - CASE W. RES. - (forthcoming

1990).
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have a good deal more knowledge about their subjects than does a
generalist judge.
Judicial review was inferred from the fact that we have a written
Constitution, which by its own terms is "Law." Not only the Framers
whose words on the subject antedate the approval of the document
(particularly Alexander Hamilton in the FederalistPapers and James
Wilson in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention),2 but also the
Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison,3 derived judicial review from
the quality of the Constitution as law-a decision taken yesterday that
binds us when exercising public power today.' The Constitution establishes a limited government using rules, which is how we departed
from the United Kingdom, whose government is regulated by tradition. Rules imply enforcement. Hence judicial review.
This method of justifying judicial acts implies a corresponding
limit. When there is no rule of law, the decision is taken by vote
among the people and. their representatives. Moral views not only inform votes but also shape rules of law; still they are not themselves
law. Whether to be governed by John Rawls' maximin principlesomething appropriate only for a highly risk-averse populace-is settled by determining the risk preferences of an actual populace (rather
than supposing that a decision has been made by deductive logic). As
Dean Ely crackedi. a judge may not say: "We like Rawls, you like
Nozick. We win, 6-3. Statute invalidated." 5 If a judge wrote such an
opinion, the judgment properly would be treated like an editorial in
The Elkhart Truth: no one would need to comply.
Mundane, you say. We know all this. Fine. Yet I start here because how judges approach their tasks depends on what those tasks
are. Professor Schauer starts with the academy not only because he
knows it well, but also because he seeks to transfer to judges what he
learns by introspection. Yet although, as he says, much of the legal
writing from the law schools is advocacy journalism rather than scholarship, and although the professor-advocates seek to influence others'
behavior, it does not follow that the lessons are transferrable to judges
who also seek to influence conduct. One could say the opposite: that
because the. methods of influence-persuasion for professors, prison
2. FEDERALIST NO: 78, at 491-93 (A. Hamilton) (B.F. Wright ed. 1961); Remarks of James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention (Dec. 7, 1787), reprinted in PENNSYLVANIA AND THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787-1788, at 304-05 (L. McMaster & F. Stone eds. 1888).

3. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. See generally Easterbrook, Approaches to JudicialReview, in THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: AN
ENDURING CONSTITUTION IN A CHANGING WORLD 147 (J. David & R. B. McKay eds. 1989).
5. J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 58 (1980).
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for judges--differ, so must the tools of interpretation. Scholars are
paid to be novel; judges are paid to be right.
Professor Schauer finds it "not immediately apparent" why a professor rather than a judge is giving the principal lecture. This is not
for want of trying. The dean couldn't get a judge-at least not this
judge, and undoubtedly he tried others. Why should judges know
much about what they do? Do not ask a rat to analyze a maze, as
opposed to run it. Karl Llewellyn expressed disappointment that his
academic colleagues appointed to the bench by President Franklin
Roosevelt did not write about their work and could not describe to
him how they did their jobs.6 No surprise here. Objectivity is the first
ingredient of scholarship-it is why medical experiments are double
blind.
Judges are not objective about themselves or their roles. No one
is. Economists suppose that businesses maximize profits. If you ask
managers whether they maximize, they will answer that they don't.
Does it follow that economics is wrong? That depends on whether
some other set of assumptions would produce more accurate results.
George Stigler conducted a survey that wonderfully illuminates both
the limits of surveys and the limits of self-knowledge. He asked a selection of managers whether they set prices so as to maximize the
firms' profits. They replied that they do not. Then Stigler asked
whether they would make more money if they reduced prices. They
said no. Next he asked whether they would make more money if they
increased their prices. Once again they said no. Well, there you have
it. A scholar might infer that the managers were maximizing profits,
although they would not accept the conclusion.
So you should not put much stock in what I say about judges.
Still, I am here and offer a few observations. All of them suggest answers to the question "What's so special about judges?" All answers
to this question must take into account the things that are at least
arguably distinctive: judges' tenure, their insistent demands to be
obeyed, and the fact that appellate judges are the last generalists of the
legal profession.
1. Tenure. There is much hoo-hah about federal judges' life tenure and salary protection. Professors of law have the same benefits-if
these attributes are benefits at all when both judges and professors
make less than the median lawyer, and inflation makes worthless the
promise that salaries will not be cut. Nothing special here. Or is
there?
Why do judges have tenure? Judges like what they are doing, and
6. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 264-65 (1960).
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they value the office independent of the money. (Why else did they
take these jobs?) Tenure liberates the judge from contemporary political pressures. The judge needn't conform to retain the job. Yet why
should we ameliorate the pressure to conform? (It can never be eliminated-not if the judge values praise or contemplates the possibility of
advancement.) One possibility is that freedom from the demands of
the present enables the judge to be a better servant of the past. 7 A
constitution is designed to constrain the present. Today's majority
must live within guidelines established by yesterday's majorities-and
for our Constitution, yesterday's super-majorities. Demands from the
past are more likely to be honored, even in the fact of a strong contrary view today (which we usually denigrate as "temporary passions"), if the judge may not be turned out of office on account of
faithful obedience to rules.
A second possibility is that tenure liberates the judge from lawyesterday's as well as today's. Instead of implementing either a decision taken in Philadelphia in 1787 or a decision taken in Washington
in 1987, the judge may direct that the government do what the judge
prefers. This does not imply whimsy; the judge may draw his vision
from great political philosophers or other sources external to his
druthers. But we know that however sublime the vision, it was twice
in the minority-then and now.
It would not be insane to give judges such powers. Anyone
knowing the ability of interest groups to defeat the interests of the
majority may think that .in the judiciary the "real" public interest
could prevail. But it is most improbable that the Framers of our Constitution authorized anything of the kind. Recall that they believed
people vain and corruptible, in need of check. The design of the government places power against power, and uses brief tenure as a leash.
(The "corruption" could be "intellectual more than monetary; to say
that "power corrupts" is not to say that the officeholder is on anyone's
payroll.) Madison knew about the evils of faction but explained in
FederalistNo. 10 that the diffusion of power between state and federal
governments, and among branches, was the best check on faction.8
Diffusion is the antithesis of concentration of power in the hands of
the "wise."
Practical politicians gravely worried about the power of faction
and the imperfection of all those who wield power were unlikely to
7. In addition to the many historical sources, see Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciaryin
an Interest-GroupPerspective, 18 J.L. & EcON. 875 (1975).
8. FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); see also FEDERALIST No. 51, at 358-59 (J. Madison) (B.F.
Wright ed. 1961). See generally Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29 (1985).
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suppose that a tenured, deliberately self-indulgent group of people
would be the protectors of the Republic. No, judges have tenure in
spite of, not because of, its liberating effect. It is odd that the astute
students of government who met in Philadelphia did not comment on
the dual effects of tenure; Hamilton's FederalistNo. 78 is touching in
its belief that insulation from daily politics will produce faithful implementation. Perhaps Hamilton and his contemporaries recognized the
liberating effect of tenure but thought it unimportant because "the
least dangerous branch" lacks the power of the purse.9
Contrast the academy. Professors need not be faithful to the past.
They are out to understand the past and change the present; obedience
to a dead hand is not part of the formula of good scholarship. A free
mind is apt to err-most mutations in thought, as well as in genes, are
neutral or harmful-but because intellectual growth flows from the
best of today standing on the shoulders of the tallest of yesterday, the
failure of most scholars and their ideas is unimportant. High risk
probably is an essential ingredient of high gain. Academic tenure is
desired for reasons opposite to that of judicial tenure: scholars have
freedom so that they may be creative, and in spite of the possibility
that tenure may protect routineers who unblinkingly do today what
was done yesterday.
Because the unwelcome byproduct of tenure for judges is the
raison d'Atre of tenure for scholars, and the reverse, introspection into
how one group functions will not be the best guide for the other.
2 Obedience. Which effect of tenure is desired and which is tolerated differs between groups because judges wield the power of the
state. Let me now turn the knife slightly and ask, not why a few public officials have tenure, but why people should obey judges. Judges
question the acts of the other branches and on occasion do otherwise
than these rules command. The judge refuses to abide by a statute
because he believes that some higher law requires this. Although the
judge as a person is no less fallible than the members of the other
branches, the judge insists that no one is entitled to question judicial
decisions in the way judges themselves question other persons'. Why
this difference? Why should the President and the people not treat
judges' opinions as judges treat statutes: to be carried out when persuasive, but not otherwise?
If judges claim a power to act on the basis of contested moral and
9. They did not anticipate Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990), but this is hardly surprising. Taxation at the command of judges was not plausible until the Constitution created the sort of
costly rights that are attributable to the Civil War amendments and the decisions of the twentieth
century.
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political considerations, there is no particular reason why their decisions should be conclusive. Philosophers have debated for hundreds of
years the conditions of justice. A pluralist society will contain people
who hold different and often incompatible views. To say that there is
no "right" answer to these questions is to say that political society can
tolerate different (and conflicting) dispositions. Judges' demand for
obedience is supportable if the "higher law" informing their decision is
law; a judge has at least the virtue of disinterest in interpreting the
law, and the disinterested answer may be applied to the political
branches. Judges are "interested" persons, though, when the question
is moral. Everyone would like society at large to be governed by his
philosophical conclusions, to share his aspirations and concerns. Fervent belief in a moral judgment makes the judge more rather than less
"interested" in the outcome, and diminishes any claim to be obeyed
when addressing them.
A professor may spend a career developing arguments about
which legal or philosophical position is superior, but his rivals will not
leap into prison at his command. (We view as barbaric societies that
legislate "right answers" to moral matters, largely because we do not
believe that there are "right answers"--or that if there are, political
processes are good at finding and enforcing them.) Freedom for the
scholar follows from the fact that he must persuade rather the coerce.
It is tolerable because a scholar's errors do not injure strangers. The
power of coercion implies forbearance by judges, a fundamentally different role. Judges may not derive the power to coerce others from the
existence of legal rules and then say: "Now that I have the power, I
needn't follow the rules." Rules are the source of the power being
asserted.
3. Portfolios. Judges are the administrative agencies with the largest portfolios-the last real generalists in the law. This has conse=
quences for how they understand their jobs, including the limits on
their competence.
Much of the judge-centered scholarship in contemporary law
schools assumes that judges have the leisure to examine subjects
deeply and resolve debates wisely. Professors believe they have this
capacity and attribute it to judges. Pfah! Professors, like most practitioners these days, are specialists. They devote lifetimes to understanding one or two fields in depth. If they are energetic they write
three to six articles per year. More often they write one, or none at all.
Scholarship is hard work.
In 1989 I issued 67 published opinions and was responsible for
perhaps 30 unpublished opinions. You can work it out that I partici-
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pated in approximately 300 cases, with perhaps three issues presented
in the average case. Judges have a broad understanding of the law, not
a deep one. Who can study 900 issues in depth? With luck, pluck,
and awareness of intellectual limits, a judge may succeed in holding
the rate of error as low as 5%. You may rest assured that we lack the
rigorous training in music, metaphysics, mathematics, and gymnastics
that Plato thought essential to his guardians-and that the process for
selecting judges does not check whether the candidate has the acquaintance with the conduct of the Peloponnesian Wars that Learned Hand
thought essential.10 The demands of the office preclude the ongoing
intellectual study and extended discourse that would help a judge fulfill the expectations others have of judicial work.
Although judges inevitably come up short compared to the academy in depth of study, they will (at least should) make fewer errors.
For good scholars are bolder than good judges, and accordingly are
wrong more often. Progress is made by decades of writing, contradiction, refinement, and replication. The fields I know best, antitrust and
corporate law, are in turmoil in the academy not only because different
scholars bring different ideologies, but also because there are vast bodies of data tugging in different directions, and more tests still to perform. " A high proportion of all ideas is unsuccessful (most papers are
never'cited, even by their authors). A very few scholars, both in ages
past and today, produce a high percentage of all the ideas we find
useful. These successful ideas have emerged after decades of attack
and parry in the journals, nurtured by intellectual communities (the
"Chicago School" of economics, for example). NO one would propose
the direct translation of a randomly-selected paper in a given field into
a rule of law-yet we give this effect to opinions written by persons
who have devoted less thought to the question than has the author of
that paper.
What happens when you turn a generalist loose in a complex
10. I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon to pass on a question of
coAstitutional law, to have at least a bowing acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with
Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with
Machiavelli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with the
books which have been specifically written on the subject. For in such matters everything
turris upon the spirit in which he approaches the questions before him. The words he must

construe are empty vessels into which he can pour nearly anything he will. Men do not
gather figs of thistles, nor supply institutions from judges whose outlook is limited by parish
or class. They must be aware that there are before them more than verbal problems; more
than final solutions cast in generalizations of universal applicability.
Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1930).
11. See generally, Bebchuck, The Debate on ContractualFreedom in CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1395 (1989) (corporations); INNOVATION, ANTITRUST AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY (D. Teece &
T. Jorde eds., forthcoming 1991) (antitrust).
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world? An ignorant or unwise judge will be unaware of his limits and
is apt to do something foolish. A sophisticated judge understands that
he is not knowledgeable and so tries to limit the potential damage.
How is this done? By and large, it is done by constructing "five-part
balancing tests." Not only judges but also the leaders of the bar find
this approach congenial. The American Law Institute's Restatements
teem with multi-factor approaches.
It is much easier to see what is relevant to a solution than to
know how to use these relevant things to achieve the optimal solution.
So the court lists what it thinks relevant. Other judges later add to the
list. A particularistic approach is a form of damage-control: Judges
who can neither know the full implications of rules nor predict private
responses to them abolish rules. (Balancing is also useful for judges
who seek to enhance their own discretion at the expense of the legislative branch, but I am not concerned here with this problem.)
Coping with uncertainty in this way limits the damage any opinion can do at the expense of eliminating law. Balancing tests are not
"tests"; the factors on these laundry lists conflict with each other, and
12
the lists never provide weights to resolve the inevitable conflicts.
"Balancing" is a confession of the inability to devise tests. That is a
big loss, for you will recall that judicial review derives from the existence of law-from the possibility, at least in principle, that there are
right legal answers to hard legal questions. A court that throws up its
hands also logically gives up any entitlement to have the last word.
Things get worse. Multi-factor approaches to the tough questions
increase the amount of litigation. Cases can be settled when parties
agree on the likely outcome. When there are no rules of law, when the
judge must apply his-own weights to inconsistent factors, agreement is
less likely. So the fuzzy standards that come out of multi-member
courts doomed to make inconsistent decisions, on which sit judges
who recognize the limits of their own understanding, make litigation
more common and so aggravate the very conditions that lead to these
standards. It is a mark of the difficulty of predicting outcomes that
appeals in the federal system have been rising five times faster than the
number of cases filed."3 If legal rules are simple, then once the trial
12. E.g., Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 966-68, 97679, 984-95 (1987); Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85, 109-15; Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1185 (1989). Cf.Coffin, Judicial Balancing:
The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16 (1988).
13. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 110 (April 2, 1990), observing that in 1940 litigants filed one appeal per forty terminations in
the district court, and in 1989 one in eight. Because the great bulk of civil cases are settled, one appeal
per eight terminations may add up to more than one appeal per litigated case.
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court finds the facts the case is over. If rules are complex, knowing the
facts may be insufficient; appeal ensues. Until the'last judge has spoken, it is not possible to know" the reslt under .a multi-factor approach. New judges bring new weights to the conflicting factors.
Every new opinion is apt to make the standard.a little more complexespecially when the judge boosts the level of generality, an increasingly
14
common move that liberates the court from all semblance of-rules.
The alternative is a bright-line rule, which may be a calamity for different reasons.
Multi-factor approaches also invite ex post pie-slicing. Take the
events as given; ask how' losses should be apportioned among the parties. This is common in litigation, for judges' emphasis is on the facts
before them and. not on how rules affect future conduct. When there
are no "rules" the tug of fair treatment is. especially strong. Judges
who have personal idiosyncrasies or ideologies may indulge them
freely; the true reasons for decisions are hard to discern. Yet courts
cannot fool society for long. Observations about how things turn out
ex post become the expectation. Judges who believe that .they write for
"this day and case alone" are deluding themselves--or they deny that
there is a rule of law by which the significance of the "particular facts"
is understood. If there is a rule, it will be inferred; if there are only
contradictory decisions, society will learn to muddle through without
a reliable system of courts. In either event, whatever benefits a rule
would produce ex ante are lost.' 5 The tug between the ex ante and the
ex post in litigation is unending." A judge who believes that there is
"no rule," but only facts and circumstances, is apt to produce a porridge of ex post reallocation and personal predilection.
14. See, e.g., Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333,
2351 (1989), defining liberty as "freedom not to conform" and using that definition to argue that a
mother in an adulterous relationship must conform to a demand that she make the child available to
the natural father, and that every state must conform to Justice'Brennan's view of the proper familial
relations. The Justice did not see the irony in using a "freedom not to conform" as the basis for a
demand that the Court be obeyed and that states alter rules of law that have endured for centuries.

Justice Brennan and the two other Justices who joined his opinion in Michael H. also believe that
fathers have no rights of any kind when the question is whether the mother may abort the pregnancy.

These Justices did not attempt to reconcile their view in Michael H. that the Due Process Clause
subordinates the mother's and child's interests to the father's with their view in the abortion cases that

the Due Process Clause subordinates the child's and father's interests to the mother's. Because it is
possibte to prove anything you want with a kit of "interest balancing" tools, they probably have no

obligation to try. Using levels of abstraction such as "freedom not to conform," a judge may decree
anything-yet why, if there is such a "freedom not to conform," must everyone else follow the'lead of
the Court?
15. See generally Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 10-12 (1984).

16. For a recent application to a common law question, see Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d
210 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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You might think that I am about to suggest that judges resign en
masse, before we do any more damage. Not at all. The problems I
have been discussing become acute only if we suppose that judges invent the rules rather than apply them. 7 It takes much more information to invent than to apply. The Constitution and the stock of
precedents contain the results of the labors of thousands of lawyers
and judges.'" The more modest the judge-that is, the more the judge
conforms to the premise that judicial review depends on "law" that
binds Court and Congress alike-the greater the value of the accumulated body of rules. Trying to make fresh moral judgments or to decide what contemporary society "really wants"---or "really ought to
want if they were smart like us"-is complex business that is not
suited to the judicial office even if it has been authorized (which it has
not been).
Judges apply well only rules that they have internalized. They do
not have time to start anew on each case, and the variance from judge
to judge would be intolerable if they did. Constitutional scholarship
does not much influence judges, because unlike chemists who pore
over professional journals, judges do not read the law reviews.
A few, simple rules of law go a long way. When judges start to
reach for Augustine or worry whether nine "factors" capture the full
complexity of "the real world," they ought to stop, reconsider what
separates a professor from a judge, and relax. There is likely to be a
simple rule, a bit of law, that can be used in its stead. When there is
not, courts should recognize that if law runs out representative democracy still exists.

17. Lest you think that my legal education stopped with Blackstone, I disclaim the idea that
judges are like clocks, with gears producing outcomes. Interstitial ("molecular," Holmes would say)
movements are desirable, and anyway are inevitable. I am more concerned with larger changes, and
with trying to decide by "constitutional law" when all the judge has to offer is a combination of bluster
and strongly held moral views.
18. See Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422
(1988). The value of precedent is qualified, though, by the fact that multi-member courts produce
conflicting decisions. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizingthe Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982). Because contradictory premises are built into the cases, a "rich" body of precedent may make decision
harder without constraining discretion.
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